By Alan Hazlett

The worth of precise trust has performed a critical position in historical past of philosophy—consider Socrates’ slogan that the unexamined lifestyles isn't really worthy residing, and Aristotle’s declare that everybody clearly desires knowledge—as good as in modern epistemology, the place questions about the price of data have lately taken middle level. It has frequently been assumed that actual representation—true belief—is worthy, both instrumentally or for its personal sake. In A luxurious of the Understanding, Allan Hazlett deals a severe research of that assumption, and of the most ways that it may be defended.


Hazlett defends the belief that actual trust is at such a lot occasionally priceless. within the first a part of the e-book, he goals the view that actual trust is in general larger for us than fake trust, and argues that fake ideals approximately ourselves—for instance, unrealistic optimism approximately our futures and approximately other folks, corresponding to overly optimistic perspectives of our friends—are usually important vis-a-vis our well being. within the moment half, he pursuits the view that fact is “the target of belief,” and argues for anti-realism in regards to the epistemic worth of actual trust. jointly, those arguments include a problem to the philosophical assumption of the price of actual trust, and recommend another photo, on which the truth that a few humans love fact is all there's to “the worth of real belief.”

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Additional resources for A Luxury of the Understanding: On the Value of True Belief

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62, Hurka 2001, pp. 12–13). 5) and intrinsic value.  42), and that claim is obviously relevant to our inquiry into the value, whether eudaimonic or “epistemic,” of true belief. Is this claim plausible? And what exactly does it mean? Truth itself is neither good nor bad. Some truths are good (that no one was hurt in the plane crash) and others are bad (that the Lakers won in the NBA Finals).  135). Consider the fact that there is nothing especially good, in general, about my getting at the truth via some propositional attitude or other.

Recall the second idea mentioned above: that there is something in the nature or essence of human beings, or in the nature or essence of our beliefs, that makes us, or our beliefs, directed at the truth. One form this idea might take is the claim that everyone wants knowledge, as a consequence of human nature. This is a descriptive interpretation of the principle of curiosity, on which everyone wants knowledge. This is precisely the kind of interpretation we presently seek, since we sought some way for desire-fulfillment theories of wellbeing to say that knowledge is partially constitutive of wellbeing, for everybody.

We can understand life-satisfaction theories of wellbeing (Sumner 1996, Tiberius 2008, Tiberius and Plakias 2010) as species of desire-fulfillment theories of wellbeing. On these views, the extent to which a person’s life goes well or badly is principally a matter of the extent to which she appraises or evaluates her life positively (perhaps along some specific dimension). “Desire” is here understood broadly, so that the state of being satisfied with one’s life is understood as a species of desire-fulfillment.

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